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The transfer of ownership of securities has historically
been accomplished through the use of public exchanges, such
as the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and NASDAQ,
which are subject to stringent statutory and regulatory
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regulations. Typically, investors purchase and sell equity
securities on exchanges based on current available pricing data.
Large purchases or the unloading of shares on the open market
may result in a substantial increase or diminution in the price
of the shares. Large institutional investors such as mutual funds
and the like are wary of making sizeable investments in
particular securities because such investments may then cause
the securities to fluctuate considerably and the price may be
negatively affected.

To address this concern, “dark pools of liquidity” – or,
simply “dark pools” – arose as a form of an alternative trading
system (“ATS”)1 in an effort to avoid national trading systems.
Using dark pools, financial institutions are able to conceal the
trades until they are placed. This practice avoids tipping their
intentions and avoids a run-up or downturn of the securities
prior to the trades.2 Dark pools now account for more stock
trades than the NYSE, although it is worth noting that the
NYSE set up a dark pool of its own as a one-year pilot Retail
Liquidity Program in 2012.3 Although the word “dark” in
connection with dark pools (as the word “shadow” in shadow
banking) connotes seemingly sinister transactions, no such
implication should be ascribed to these methodologies of
providing liquidity to financial transactions.

The methodologies of using these alternative platforms,
abuses, and possible remedial alternatives were highlighted in a
number of books, including Scott Patterson’s Dark Pools4,
which discussed computerized trading algorithms, the history
of dark pools, and the systems in place such as the Island,
Datek, and Tradebot systems. The “Flash Crash” of 2010 is a
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recent example of where, in a matter of a little more than a half
hour, the stock market index collapsed, falling about 1,000
points (although the losses were later rapidly regained) due to
the errant activity of a singular trader. By using algorithms, the
trader allegedly placed many thousands of S&P stock index
futures contracts with the intent of later disposing of them.
High frequency traders (“HFTs”) apparently also were able to
take advantage of the wild fluctuations in pricing that came as
a result of the manipulation. The crash led to a Report of the
Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Committee, which made a series of
recommendations in an endeavor to curb abuses and harm to
investors.5

The abuses of HFTs were more particularly brought to
light by Michael Lewis’ Flash Boys,6 whose iconic book was a
best seller that was discussed in numerous communications
outlets. The book highlighted how the construction of a $300
million, 827-mile fiber-optic link through mountains and rivers
from the Chicago Mercantile exchange to NASDAQ gave high
frequency trading firms, which most often used dark pools for
trading, a significant trading advantage by its slight (1 to 4.5
milliseconds) but vital communication time advantage.7 The
book’s release and the uproar that followed led to
investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
possible insider trading violations and other violations under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Separately, the Securities
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) undertook an in-depth review
of the adequacy and possible need for additional regulatory
safeguards to protect investors.8
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PROS AND CONS OF DARK POOLS

The initial raison d’etre for dark pools was to safeguard
investors, particularly those participating in mutual funds and
pension plans, from seeing their investments altered by
potential adverse price fluctuations brought about by large
institutional trades.9 By utilizing approximately 45 dark pools
engaged in trades, the orders placed were anonymous, which
came to light some period after the trades had taken place.
Using dark pools realized cost savings from exchange trading
fees exacted by public exchanges, stability of pricing, and
reduction of risk. The HFTs were able to purchase shares a
microsecond before a share order, e.g., by pension funds, a
microsecond before the public order of shares became public,
profiting from the slight rise or fall in the purchase price
thereby altering the price of the shares.10 Nevertheless, there
has been much rethinking concerning whether the regulatory
permissiveness of dark pools encourages misbehavior that may,
in fact, outweigh the alleged advantages of HFTs. The
remarkable growth of dark pools, which now constitute 40
percent of all U.S. stock trades, has led some to question
whether the negative consequences of dark pool trades
outweigh the intended good results.11

There are obvious adverse results of dark pools’
permissiveness. Investors purchasing or selling shares on “lit”
exchanges may encounter a mispricing of the shares inasmuch
as large dark trades may substantially impact the price
thereof.12 Based upon the multi-trillion dollar sums of all
trades, a small mispricing brings about substantial financial
consequences. The volume of such trades inevitably brings
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about malfeasance such as: insider trading; diminution of
income to public exchanges, such as the NYSE, which are
highly regulated; less opportunity for investors utilizing public
exchanges; lack of data required from brokers before the
execution of a trade; favoritism of valued large institutional
traders; and a general lack of information normally made
available to individual investors.13

There are contrary views, as in any controversial area of
research. Haoxiang Zhu of MIT, in an exhaustive mathematical
analysis, concluded that rather than being harmful for price
discovery, “under natural conditions, the addition of a dark
pool concentrates informed traders on the exchange and
improves price discovery.”14 He observed that improved price
discovery on the exchange coincided with exchange liquidity,
that delay costs hamper liquidity traders from crossing from
one venue to another, and that dark pool price discovery
becomes weaker the longer the information is delayed from the
public.15 In another lengthy mathematical analysis of dark
pools concerning the effect of undisplayed liquidity on market
quality and fair access to sources of undisplayed liquidity, the
authors concluded that dark pool crossing networks increase
liquidity only “when it is added to a dealership market where
traders cannot compete for the provision of liquidity by
submitting limit orders.” When a dark pool is added to a Limit
Order Book, orders tend to shift to the dark market, which thus
offers market participants order migration rather than order
creation. The depth and volume deteriorates on the Limit Order
Book while total volume increases.16 High depth and small
spread increase traders’ use of dark pools.
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REGULATION OF DARK POOLS

Regulation Alternative Trading Systems

In 1988, Regulation Alternative Trading Systems (ATS)
was the first major regulatory enactment governing ATS
adopted by the SEC. It permitted ATSs to choose whether to
register with the Commission as national securities exchanges
or as broker-dealers. It also required ATSs to comply with
certain additional requirements, concerning amending their
books and records based upon their activities and trading
volume.17 The purposes of the regulation were to strengthen the
public markets for securities, while encouraging innovative
new markets mainly due to the incorporation of new
technologies designed to give investors additional services
more efficiently and at a lower cost. The regulation provided a
new regulatory framework for ATSs, addressed the disparities
affecting investor protection and the markets as a whole due to
the heretofore operation as private markets outside the national
market system, available only to chosen subscribers regulated
as broker-dealers, provided adequate surveillance for market
manipulation and fraud due to the ATSs lack of obligation to
provide investors a fair opportunity to participate in the ATSs
or to treat their participation fairly and ensured that the ATSs
are sufficient to handle rapid increases in trading volume,
especially in times of market volatility.18

The regulation thus provided an incentive for the
growth of ATSs by granting an exemption from the onerous
regulatory requirements governing stock exchanges. The
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statutory definition of an “exchange” under Rule 3b-16 was
revised from that of a “market place or facilities for bringing
together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise
performing with respect to securities the function commonly
performed by a stock exchange”19 to mean any organization,
association, or group of persons that “brings together the orders
of multiple buyers and sellers and uses established, nondiscretionary methods…under which such orders interact with
each other, and the buyers and sellers entering such orders
agree to the terms of a trade.”20 The Rule excludes systems that
perform only traditional broker-dealer activities, i.e.,
“(1) systems that merely route orders to other facilities for
execution; (2) systems operated by a single registered market
maker to display its own bids and offers and the limit orders of
its customers, and to execute trades against such orders; and
(3) systems that allow persons to enter orders for executions
against the bids and offers of a single dealer.21

To be exempt from registration as an exchange under
the ATS Rule, an ATS is required to be registered as a brokerdealer and file an initial operation report and appropriate
amendments for major changes.22 It must also: display
subscriber orders, if it has an order volume of five percent or
more of a security; provide national securities exchanges the
prices and sizes of the highest buy price and lowest sale price
of the covered security; establish written standards for granting
access to trading on its system; and establish procedures to
ensure adequate systems capacity, integrity, and contingency
planning wherein the ATS exercises 20 percent or more of
trading volume in any single security.23
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Regulation NMS
The SEC adopted Regulation NMS in 2005,24which
imposed substantive rules to modernize the U.S. equity markets
in the light of the expansion of both new and expanded
developments therein.25 It adopted the “Order Protection Rule”
that requires trading centers to establish, maintain, and enforce
(with exceptions) written policies and procedures to prevent
execution of trades at lower prices to those protected quotation
displayed at other trading centers. The regulation provides that
a quotation must be immediately and automatically accessible
to investors. The “Access Rule” provides the requirement of a
fair and non-discriminatory access to quotations and a limit on
access fees to harmonize the pricing of quotations across
different trading centers. It also requires each national
securities exchange to adopt policies prohibiting members from
acting in a pattern or practice of displaying quotations that lock
or cross automated quotations.

A third rule, the “Sub-Penny Rule,” prohibits market
participants from accepting, ranking, or displaying orders,
quotations, or indications of interest in a pricing increment
smaller than a penny, except for orders, quotations, or
indications of interest that are priced at less than $1.00 per
share. The SEC also adopted amendments to the “Market Data
Rules” by updating requirements for consolidating,
distributing, and displaying market information, as well as
amendments to the joint industry plans for disseminating
market information that modify the formulas for allocating plan
revenues, the so-called Allocation Amendment, and broaden
participation in plan governance, the so-called Governance
Amendment.26
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Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (SCI)

The SEC adopted Regulation Systems Compliance and
Integrity,27 which applies in part to ATSs that trade NMS and
non-NMS stocks exceeding a designated volume, to reduce the
occurrence of systems issues, to improve the resiliency of
systems problems, and to enhance SEC oversight in order to
strengthen the technology infrastructure of the US securities
markets. It requires that the SCI entities adopt certain policies
and procedures to ensure that they have the levels of capacity,
integrity, resiliency, availability, and security to maintain their
operational capability and promote fair and orderly markets.
These entities are: required to take corrective action in the
event of systems disruptions and related issues; notify the SEC
and market participants of such occurrences; conduct annual
internal review of qualified personnel; submit quarterly reports;
and maintain certain books and records.28

Proposed Regulatory Amendments to NMS ATSs

On November 18, 2015, the SEC proposed rules that
would substantially affect ATSs that trade stocks on listed
national market system (NMS) stocks on national securities
exchanges.29 The purpose of the proposed regulation is to
enhance operational transparency and regulatory oversight of
ATSs, which includes dark pools. The regulation requires
disclosures on a proposed Form ATS-N, which includes
information concerning the trading of NMS stocks, the types of
orders and market data used on the ATS and its execution and
priority procedures. The disclosures will be made publicly
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available on the SEC website to enable market participants to
have more complete knowledge of how decisions and actions
are made by their brokers and to determine whether to make
use of ATSs. The SEC can then make a determination whether
or not to qualify ATSs for exemptions under existing
regulations from the more onerous requirements of
exchanges.30

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

The major efforts of the regulatory authorities are
designed to ensure transparency of trades of securities so that
investors have an accurate reflection of the true market price of
particular securities.31 One of the consequences of dark pools’
trading in securities is that large traders are able to secure
major positions in companies without the knowledge of
investors until after purchases, thus avoiding a substantial
increase or decrease in the value of the shares that would
otherwise take place if accomplished openly.32 The SEC is
cognizant of the manipulation of shares that almost inevitably
take place, particularly by individuals or firms trading on inside
information.

SAC Capital Hedge Fund

The indictment of individuals of SAC Capital hedge
fund, including Matthew Martoma and other employees of the
firm, concerning inside information that allegedly enabled the
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firm to make very sizeable profits illustrates how dark pool
funding enables such firms to reap profits through increases or
decreases of large positions in a company before it becomes
openly known to the investment community.33 Martoma, who
was SAC Capital’s portfolio manager with respect to
investment decisions in health care industries, ascertained
information that a particular drug to alter Alzheimer’s disease
was not effective, which then enabled SAC Capital to illegally
gain hundreds of millions in profits – and secured a $9 million
bonus for Martoma – by shorting 17.7 million shares of Elan
and Wyeth stock worth $700 million. He received a nine-year
prison sentence and loss of gains and other assets.34

Pipeline Trading System

The SEC instituted a series of enforcement actions
consisting mainly of cease-and-desist orders coupled with
significant fines against a number of firms engaged in activities
involving dark pool transactions. The first action taken by the
SEC against a dark pool trading platform was against Pipeline
Trading Systems and two of its senior officers for failing to
disclose to customers that the vast majority of orders received
by it were filled by an affiliate of Pipeline. The company
settled the action by a payment of $1 million fine by the firm
and $100,000 each by its founder and chief executive officer as
well as by its former president. Pipeline made alleged false
claims that its trading platform was a “crossing network” that
matched customer orders with those from other customers,
thereby providing “natural liquidity.” The alleged falsity
consisted of the fact that its parent company owned a trading
entity that filled the vast majority of customer orders on
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Pipeline’s system. Other charges included alleged conflict of
interest that resulted from paying the affiliate’s traders using a
formula that rewarded them in part for giving favorable prices
to Pipeline’s customers – which information was concealed
from its customers – as well as falsely stating it treated all users
the same and failing to protect customer’s confidential trading
information.35

Barclays and Credit Suisse

More onerous actions were taken against Barclays
Capital Inc. and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC. Barclays
Capital Inc. was accused of willfully violating §17(a)(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, §15(c)(3) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Regulation ATS, Rule 301(b)(2). Section
17(a)(2) of the ’33 Act makes it unlawful to obtain money or
property by means of an untrue statement of material fact or
omission. Section 15(3)(3) of the 1934 Act, and the SEC Rules
thereunder, require that a broker/dealer possess risk
management controls and supervisory procedures reasonably
designed to prevent entry of orders exceeding appropriate preset credit or capital thresholds for each customer. Regulation
ATS, Rule 301(b)(2) requires certain designated forms be filed
at least prior to 20 days before commencing operation as an
ATS and when implementing a material change to its operation
when such material becomes inaccurate.

Specifically, Barclays was accused of making
misleading statements and omissions of material facts
concerning the operation of its LX product feature entitled
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Liquidate Profiling, which it alleged was a powerful tool to
protect against predatory trading. 36 It was also alleged that
Barclays failed to establish adequate safeguards and procedures
to protect subscribers’ confidential information and other
related representations of its LX product. 37 As a result, a
consent order was entered into by the parties, which prevented
Barclays from causing present and future violations of the said
Rule of the Exchange Act and included a censure and a fine of
$35 million.38 In the New York Attorney General’s complaint,
which preceded that of the federal government, the allegations
were comparable to that of the U.S. Attorney General, which
resulted in an installation of an independent monitor at
Barclays to conduct an independent review of Barclays’
electronic trading business and further reforms to comply with
New York law.39

In January 2016, there were two proceedings against
Credit Suisse Securities that resulted in comparable orders of
cease-and-desist and censure, together with fines of $20
million and $10 million respectively.40 The allegations
concerned alleged obtaining money or property by means of
making false statements or omissions thereof; failing to file
timely amendments to required forms after implementing a
material change to the operation of the ATS; limitation to fair
access to services offered by the ATS by applying standards in
an unfair or discriminatory manner; and proper executions of
orders to buy or sell securities. There are pending or settled a
multitude of additional SEC enforcement actions.41

The New York State Attorney General (“AG”) has been
particularly active in initiating proceeds against Barclays and
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Credit Suisse. The AG sued the companies under New York’s
Martin Act,42 which gives wide-ranging powers to the Attorney
General’s office to investigate and prosecute securities-related
fraud and malfeasance. Section 352-c makes it a crime to
commit fraud, deception, concealment, suppression, false
pretense, and promise with respect to the purchase or sale of
securities, operate falsely as an exchange, and other related
offenses. The prosecutions by the Attorney General’s Office
have evoked controversy in what appears to be overstepping
the SEC for conduct ordinarily prosecuted by the SEC. With
the new administration commencing January 20, 2017, there is
a movement to curtail the powers of states to act against
alleged securities fraud. Similarly, allegations made against
Credit Suisse resulted in fines and comparable resolution.43

Commentators at the Wharton School of Finance and
the University of Missouri-Kansas City suggested that the fines
represented the cost of poor enforcement of existing laws and
the failure to create precedents as deterrents. They opined that
regulators should better scrutinize HFT including dark pools in
order to identify systemic risks, if any. Regulators, in their
views, should not settle cases but rather should fully prosecute
the charges alleged even if they should not prevail in order to
create precedents to thwart potential future misbehavior. It
cited New York State Attorney General’s Eric Schneiderman,
who stated that Barclays exposed its clients to predatory traders
rather than protected them. It failed to police its dark pool and
misled subscribers about data feeds.44

There are technological efforts by the U.S. government
to better gauge when unlawful insider trading takes place.
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Thus, it has instituted a national market system plan to create a
comprehensive database called the “consolidated audit trail”
(CAT), which is designed to enable government regulators to
track all trading activity within the U.S. equity and options
markets. CAT requirements include compelling self-regulation
organizations and broker-dealers to identify all customers and a
complete life cycle of all orders and transactions therein. It
requires that a plan processor create a central repository that
would receive, consolidate, and retain trade and order data;
operate, maintain, and upgrade the central repository; and
ensure its security and confidentiality of all reported data. 45 It
further requires a plan processor to submit certain information
about the order including a unique identifier for the customer
submitting the order; the identifier of the broker-dealer
submitting the order; the date and time of the order or event;
and the security symbol, price, size, order type, and other
material terms of the order.46

ADDITIONAL EFFORTS TO PROVIDE TRANSPARENCY

FINRA requires each ATS to report its weekly
aggregate volume information on a security-by-security basis
to it. FINRA then makes the information available free of
charge to the public on a two-week delayed basis concerning
Tier 1 NMS stocks (stocks in the S&P Index, the Russell 1000
Index and certain ETPs) and on all other NMS stocks and OTC
equity securities subject to its reporting requirements two
weeks after the initial reporting period. The list of FINRA
equity ATS firms is set forth in Appendix A. This is a change
from its previous policy of making the said information
available mainly to professionals, which was based on

2018 / Shedding Light on Dark Pools / 90

voluntary reporting by some ATSs on an aggregate, monthly
basis. The goal is to increase market transparency and enhance
investor confidence. Included are all dark pools’ market
facilities and other ATS, which, as of 2014, constituted more
than 30 percent of the total of OTC trading in U.S. exchangelisted equities.47

The NYSE has proposed a plan to limit trades on dark
pools by its “tick size pilot program,” which would increase a
minimum bid to five cents from a penny with respect to stocks
of companies with small market capitalizations. The restrictive
change is being reviewed by the SEC, FINRA and BATAS
Exchange Inc. have proposed less restrictive measures.48
NASDAQ has launched a new SMARTS Surveillance for Dark
Pools. SMARTS will enable regulators both in the U.S. and
globally to better monitor dark trading activities. The program
assists Multilateral Trading Facilities, ATSs, Crossing
Networks, and market participants engaged in internalizing
order flow or trading in dark pools to monitor alleged abusive
behavior therein. According to its website, it delivers full
cross-market surveillance, unfettered visibility and
transparency for dark trading and a means to prevent abusive
manipulative behavior that may lead to abuse.49 It is part of a
larger NASDAQ surveillance endeavor for surveillance for
marketplaces and regulators, market participants, foreign
exchange, and energy.50

The regulatory trend towards greater transparency may
lead to greater risks, which were the reasons for dark pool
origination. Such trend has caused dark pools to undergo a
“toxicity assessment” whereby users may become subject to
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manipulation by HFTs and others and face potential significant
fines for alleged violation of the multiplicity of US federal and
state regulations and the increased regulatory oversight by
global authorities.51 Another trend, perhaps having Barclays
and Credit Suisse in mind as well as the increasing regulatory
oversight, is the launch of Luminex Trading and Analytics
LLC in October 2015. Luminex is a dark pool consortium
engaged in large block trading of shares originated by T. Rowe
Price and Invesco and joined in by Blackrock J.P. Morgan
Asset Management, Vanguard, Goldman Sachs Asset
Management and numerous other major financial players.
Luminex alleges in its website that it is a “dark pool with the
lights on.” It claims to be the first ATS to launch in an era of
complete transparency with 100 percent transparency and
compliant with all federal and state regulations. It sought to
limit transactions costs and profit-driven conflicts of interests
by removing broker-dealers and by limiting pre-trade
information.52

FUTURE REGULATORY TRENDS

The election of Donald J. Trump as President of the
U.S., coupled with a Republican-led U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives, have created substantial uncertainty as to
whether any or substantial regulatory enactments will be
disbanded. As President-Elect stated: “I will formulate a rule
which says that for every one regulation, two old regulations
must be eliminated.” He further advised his transition team to
formulate executive actions designed “to restore our laws and
bring back our jobs.” 53 As in all campaign rhetoric, it is
difficult to separate hyperbole from future action, but it
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remains clear that the Administration will be conservativeoriented, which most often believes that many regulatory
measures act as an impediment to economic growth. Calls to
end both the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act54 and
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act55 will likely result in the said Acts be amended rather than
repealed. It appears that the authority of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council will be substantially diminished and banks
will be given much greater freedom from regulations.56

An SEC Commissioner, Luis A. Aguilar noted that
ATSs will continue to play a major role in the future and
identified that the issues include:

(1) Given that average trade sizes on dark pools that trade
equities are comparable to the same levels seen on the
exchanges, does it differ for large-cap and smaller cap stocks
and should block trading be rethought to account for the
algorithm-driven trading that dominates the current markets?

(2) Can ATSs attract sufficient liquidity to remain viable
without engaging in misconduct and can it survive without
high frequency and algorithm traders?

(3) Does the current regulatory structure favor the expansion of
dark pools and, if so, should the SEC should limit its growth or
curb the volume of orders executed in dark pools as Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive II, discussed infra, will do for
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smaller orders in Europe?;

(4) Are ATSs the best model for block trading and, if not, what
other approaches would be better suited? 57

INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF DARK POOLS

IOSCO

The International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) in its Principles on Dark Liquidity, set
forth its guidance for securities markets authorities concerning
dark liquidity. The ostensible purposes for the guidance is to
minimize the impact of dark pools and orders on the ability of
investors to ascertain the actual price of securities traded by
promoting pre- and post-trading transparency by the
encouragement of transparency orders. Such measures are
designed to mitigate the effect of potential fragmentation of
information and liquidity; ensure that regulators have access to
adequate information concerning dark pools and dark orders
for surveillance and monitoring purposes; and ensure that
market participants have sufficient information to ascertain
how their orders are handled and executed. The principles are
stated in Appendix B.58
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European Union

Dark pools have accounted for approximately 9.1
percent of stock trades in 2016, or three times the number of
trades from 2010.59 The increase has created concerns among
EU regulators, who prefer trades in “lit” markets. The EU
enacted Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID
II/MiFIR), which will come into effect on January 3, 2018 and
will impose substantial regulatory limits on such trading
venues. Limits to be imposed include four percent of overall
trading in an individual security and eight percent of overall
volume of each security with exceptions for trades of large
orders.60

It is expected that dark pools will be affected in
significant ways, including the limitation of brokers to cross
client orders internally as a result of the closure of Broker
Crossing Networks; moreover, in addition to the four and eight
percent limitations, execution of orders will be limited at its
midpoint.61 Additional requirements include major increases in
the types of financial instruments, entities required to report,
and an increase of the number of fields within a transaction
report that has to be provided (from 24 to 81).62 Some
commentators have expressed reservations concerning
MiFID’s alleging that the regulation arose from the financial
crisis at the end of the last decade, but that dark pools had
nothing to do with the crash. The allegations include the
misplaced requirements for transparency that have lost sight of
the interest of the ultimate investor; that the impact on price
formation is unknown and the imposition of caps was at the
behest of demands by the exchange lobby.63
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Switzerland

Swiss authorities are not bound by the new regulation
inasmuch as the country is not a member of the EU. But, it is
bound by its Financial Market Infrastructure Act, which
imposes no such limits upon its dark pools. Thus, unless the
EU interposes an objection to the Swiss Act, Swiss shares
traded by EU firms on Swiss@Mid will have an advantage
over comparable shares within the EU.64

Brexit

The issue arises whether and to what extent dark pool
trades will be affected by the United Kingdom’s (U.K.) exit
(Brexit) from the EU by virtue of a referendum within the U.K.
on June 23, 2016. Initially, Morgan Stanley’s MS Pool and
Deutsche Bank’s SuperX, and other major dark pools were
compelled to suspend trading, which unlike public exchanges,
could not handle the volume of trades immediately after the
vote, even though there was a rebound shortly thereafter. Some
commentators stated that this was illustrative of the superiority
of trades on public exchanges over dark pools.65

2018 / Shedding Light on Dark Pools / 96

Hong Kong

Perhaps reflecting the worldwide trend of placing
restrictions upon dark pools, Hong Kong imposed new
regulations that substantially created greater transparency
therein.66 The Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission
imposed new rules that barred retail investors from trading in
dark pools thereby preventing all but large institutional
investors, such as fund managers and professional and
experienced investors with at least HK $8 million portfolios.
The move affected Hong Kong’s 15 dark pools, which now
requires brokers to prioritize client trades over proprietary
orders and exercise operational controls. Other restrictions
include the requirement that dark pools must be members of its
stock exchange thereby reducing competition with publicly
traded securities. Among the dark pool operations affected are
those of Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Credit Suisse.67

Canada

The Investment Industry Regulatory Organization
(IIRO) of Canada issued a ruling in 2012 that sought to
maintain the integrity of the pricing process by requiring small
orders in dark pools to meet certain pricing standards and
provide a level of playing field in the same marketplace for
dark and lit orders. While acknowledging that there were
additional costs as a result of its rules and a significant drop in
dark pool trades; nevertheless, the IIRO found that there was
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no statistically significant deterioration in market quality.68 The
changes issued by the Organization according to Liquidnet, a
global institutional trading network, are: visible order priority,
(i.e., these orders had priority over orders from dark pools at
the same price and same marketplace) and meaningful price
improvement (i.e., order below block size by a dark pool had to
be better (one cent) than the displayed quote by one trading
increment). Another significant change gave the IIRO the right
to designate a minimum size for dark orders. The changes in
Canada continued to preserve the execution of large orders by
institutional investors, such as long-term pension and other
comparable investors. The ability to execute large orders
anonymously was not affected by the rules.69

CONCLUSION
The financial markets will continue to search for new
sources of liquidity to finance the expansion of world trade. As
is historically evident, investors and financial market experts
will continue to explore a multitude of methodologies to
enhance financial benefits by devising schemes to avoid
regulatory oversight and operate privately to maximize
financial returns. The presidential election of 2016 and the
assumption of office by a president who advocates the removal
of two regulations for each one created, raises the question of
whether there will be a diminishment of regulatory oversight
that results in harm to unknowing investors from new schemes
designed to maximize the benefits to the principals who create
them. It must be left to future developments to determine
whether governmental intervention will be required to prevent
the economic chaos that occurred in the latter part of the first
decade of the new century.
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APPENDIX A
FINRA LIST OF EQUITY ALTERNATIVE TRADING
SYSTEM FIRMS70

ATS
ID

Firm Name

AQU
A

AQUA
SECURITIES
L.P.

GLOBAL OTC

ARC
A

ARCHIPELA
GO
TRADING
SERVICES,
INC.

AX TRADING,
LLC

AXT
N

AX
TRADING,
LLC

BARCLAYS ATS
("LX")

LAT
S

BARCLAYS
CAPITAL
INC.

BCD
X

BARCLAYS
CAPITAL
INC.

ATS Name

AQUA

BARCLAYS
DIRECTEX

Comm
ent

Used
LEHM
prior to
Jan 26,
2015
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BIDS

BIDS
TRADING
L.P.

TRADEBOOK

BTB
K

BLOOMBER
G
TRADEBOOK
LLC

Ceased
on
Septem
ber 1,
2016

APOGEE

APO
G

CITADEL
SECURITIES
LLC

Ceased
on
April 2,
2015

CITI CROSS

CXC
X

CITIGROUP
GLOBAL
MARKETS
INC.

CitiBLOC

CBL
C

CITIGROUP
GLOBAL
MARKETS
INC.

LIQUIFI

LQFI

CITIGROUP
GLOBAL
MARKETS
INC.

Ceased
on
Novem
ber 7,
2016

CODA
MARKETS, INC.

PDQ
X

CODA

f/k/a
PDQ
ATS

BIDS TRADING
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NYF
X

CONVERGEX
EXECUTION
SOLUTIONS
LLC

VRT
X

CONVERGEX
EXECUTION
SOLUTIONS
LLC

CRO
S

CREDIT
SUISSE
SECURITIES
(USA) LLC

LIGHT POOL

LTPL

CREDIT
SUISSE
SECURITIES
(USA) LLC

NXP

DFIN

Dash Financial
LLC

DBOT ATS, LLC

DBO
X

DBOT ATS,
LLC

DEALERWEB

DLT
A

DEALERWEB
INC.

MILLENNIUM

VORTEX

CROSSFINDER

Ceased
on
Octobe
r 1,
2015

Ceased
on
Decem
ber 1,
2016
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SUPERX

DBA
X

DEUTSCHE
BANK
SECURITIES
INC.

LEVEL ATS

EBX
L

EBX LLC

FANTEX
BROKERAGE
SERVICES, LLC

FTE
X

FANTEX
BROKERAGE
SERVICES,
LLC

FNC AG STOCK,
LLC

FNC
A

FNC AG
STOCK, LLC

SIGMA X

SGM
A

GOLDMAN
SACHS
EXECUTION
&
CLEARING,
L.P.

SIGMA X2

SGM
T

GOLDMAN,
SACHS & CO

IEXG

IEX
SERVICES
LLC

IEX

Ceased
Septem
ber 2,
2016

Ceased
Septem
ber 2,
2016
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INSTINET
CONTINUOUS
BLOCK
CROSSING
SYSTEM (CBX)

ICBX

INSTINET,
LLC

INSTINET
CROSSING

XIST

INSTINET,
LLC

IBKR ATS

IATS

INTERACTIV
E BROKERS
LLC

POSIT

ITGP

ITG INC.

JPM-X

JPM
X

J.P. MORGAN
SECURITIES
LLC

JET-X

JEFX

JEFFERIES
EXECUTION
SERVICES,
INC.

KCG MATCHIT

KCG
M

KCG
AMERICAS
LLC

LIQUIDNET ATS

LQN
T

LIQUIDNET,
INC.

Used
INCA
prior to
Jun 16,
2014

Ceased
on
April 1,
2016
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LIQUIDNET H2O

LQN
A

LIQUIDNET,
INC.

LUMINEX
TRADING &
ANALYTICS
LLC

LMN
X

LUMINEX
TRADING &
ANALYTICS
LLC

MLV
X

MERRILL
LYNCH,
PIERCE,
FENNER &
SMITH INC

INSTINCT X

MLI
X

MERRILL
LYNCH,
PIERCE,
FENNER &
SMITH INC

MS POOL (ATS4)

MSP
L

MORGAN
STANLEY &
CO. LLC

MS RETAIL
POOL (ATS-6)

MSR
P

MORGAN
STANLEY &
CO. LLC

MS
TRAJECTORY
CROSS (ATS-1)

MST
X

MORGAN
STANLEY &
CO. LLC

MERRILL
LYNCH (ATS-1)

Ceased
on June
1, 2016
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CROSSSTREAM

XST
M

NATIONAL
FINANCIAL
SERVICES
LLC

OTC LINK ATS

OTC
R

OTC LINK
LLC

PRO
SECURITIES
ATS

PRO
S

PRO
SECURITIES,
L.L.C.

RCS
L

RIVER
CROSS
SECURITES,
LP

Ceased
on
Februar
y 1,
2017

BLK
X

STATE
STREET
GLOBAL
MARKETS,
LLC

Used
PULX
prior to
Feb 2,
2015
Ceased
on
March
1, 2016

RIVERCROSS

BLOCKCROSS

TRIPLESHOT

TSB
X

TRIPLESHOT
, LLC

UBS ATS

UBS
A

UBS
SECURITIES
LLC
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UST
K

USTOCKTRA
DE
SECURITIES,
INC.

VARIABLE
INVESTMENT
ADVISORS, INC.
ATS (VIAATS)

VIAT

VARIABLE
INVESTMEN
T ADVISORS,
INC.

XE

WDN
X

WEEDEN &
CO.L.P.

USTOCKTRADE
SECURITIES,
INC.
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APPENDIX B
IOSCO PRINCIPLES ON DARK LIQUIDITY

Transparency to Market Participants and Issuers

Principle 1: The price and volume of firm orders should
generally be transparent to the public. However, regulators may
choose not to require pre-trade transparency for certain types of
market structures and orders. In these circumstances, they
should consider the impact of doing so on price discovery,
fragmentation, fairness and overall market quality.

Principle 2: Information regarding trades, including those
executed in dark pools or as a result of dark orders entered in
transparent markets, should be transparent to the public. With
respect to the specific information that should be made
transparent, regulators should consider both the positive and
negative impact of identifying a dark venue and/or the fact that
the trade resulted from a dark order.

Priority of Transparent Orders

Principle 3: In those jurisdictions where dark trading is
generally permitted, regulators should take steps to support the
use of transparent orders rather than dark orders executed on
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transparent markets or orders submitted into dark pools.
Transparent orders should have priority over dark orders at the
same price within a trading venue.

Reporting to Regulators

Principle 4: Regulators should have a reporting regime and/or
means of accessing information regarding orders and trade
information in venues that offer trading in dark pools or dark
orders.

Information Available to Market Participants about Dark
Pools and Dark Orders

Principle 5: Dark pools and transparent markets that offer dark
orders should provide market participants with sufficient
information so that they are able to understand the manner in
which their orders are handled and executed.

Regulation of the Development of Dark Pools and Dark
Orders

Principle 6: Regulators should periodically monitor the
development of dark pools and dark orders in their jurisdictions
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to seek to ensure that such developments do not adversely
affect the efficiency of the price formation process, and take
appropriate action as needed.
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